COMMENT
A JUDGE'S VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL
ACTION AFFECTING THE COURTS
AVERN COHN*

I
Professor Kramer's article' suggests an addition to the mechanisms of
congressional review of proposed legislation that impacts the work of federal
courts. Certainly Congress can do a better job in its consideration of such
legislation, and Congress certainly should be informed of the events taking
place in the federal court system, as well as in the executive branch, that affect
the ability of the federal courts to do their work. It is questionable, however,
whether congressional knowledge can best be improved, as Professor Kramer
proposes, through the creation of a new agency in Congress similar to the
Office of Technology Assessment.
To answer the question, we would need to know how good ajob the Office
of Technology Assessment presently does for Congress. Is its product well
reasoned and of a high quality? Does Congress pay attention to its reports
and recommendations? Is its work free of political influence? Because
Congress has final say over procedural and evidentiary rules, control over
jurisdiction, and the ability to create new causes of action, there can be no
doubt that the federal judiciary would favor anything that would assist
Congress in doing a betterjob when it enacts laws affecting the federal courts.
From my limited experience as an observer of Congress, I have grave
doubts that an apolitical, technically proficient group of advisers can have any
real impact on the work of Congress. Professor Kramer described how
"interest groups with narrow, focused demands can often overcome more
diffuse support for broad reform." 2 He also suggested that an extensive
review of potential legislation need not be undertaken until a congressional
committee or subcommittee has indicated real interest in that legislation. 3 By
that time, however, it would likely be too late for any objective report on the
impact of the proposed legislation on the courts to have any real effect. By
then, special interest groups will have too much invested in the proposed
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legislation for an apolitical analysis and recommendation to influence
congressional action.
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, commonly called the Biden Bill in
recognition of its chief sponsor, 4 serves as a classic example of the point I am
making. The act mandates an extensive revision in the manner in which
federal district judges manage cases on their dockets. Its introduction,
however, completely bypassed the congressionally created Judicial
Conference of the United States. The bill was introduced three months
before the scheduled release date of a related report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee, 5 an apolitical, technically proficient group of the type
Professor Kramer suggests should be created. Senator Biden and the bill's
co-sponsors apparently could not wait for the Study Committee's report.
Thus, instead of debating the committee's recommendations, Congress
considered and enacted a proposal generated through the traditional political
process.
I suggest Senator Biden's timing was quite deliberate and was a successful
effort at agenda control. Judith Resnik's article describes the politics of
procedural lawmaking, particularly the rivalry between Congress and the
Judicial Conference in this area. 6 This conflict was manifested in the timing
and promotion of the Biden Bill.
II
A federal judge has some difficulty in talking candidly about the Biden Bill.
It has been packaged with Title II,7 which increases the number of federal
judges, a greatly desired objective of my colleagues. However, here too,
Congress appears to want to go its own way. The proposed increases do not
follow the Judicial Conference recommendations, which are based on
carefully considered workload statistics. Indeed, Title II calls for increases
that lack justification in the most liberal of standards for determining the
number of judges for some districts.
The major flaws in the Biden Bill itself, in my view, are its emphasis on fast
track procedures (which most often are of greater benefit to better financed
parties); its assumption that civil cases in all federal districts are going
unattended; its underestimation of the costs of implementing its requirements
($10 million is authorized); and the obvious need for significant bureaucratic
programs and procedures to implement its requirements. The good aspects
of the bill could easily be implemented by the Judicial Conference as the
managing head of the federal court system.
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The bill, I suggest, is premised on a number of invalid assumptions, or
assumptions for which proof is lacking. We have no empirical data on how
long a case "should" take from filing to disposition. We do not know how
increasing the pace of a case affects the quality of decisionmaking. The bill
assumes that all ninety-four federal judicial districts suffer from delay and that
the cause of that delay is systemic. It ignores the likely effect on the progress
of a case of the individual differences in judges, the policies of U.S. attorneys,
and the impact of the local legal culture. To my knowledge, there has been no
study of the judicial districts that do well and those that do poorly in moving
cases, or of why such a variation exists. For example, no one has described
how the judges in the Eastern District of Virginia manage their cases and have
acquired the reputation of having a "rocket docket. ' 8 We do not know why in
the Eastern District of New York, the Southern District of West Virginia, the
Districts of North Dakota, Arizona, and Alaska, and the Northern and
Southern Districts of Florida, criminal trial hours in 1989 constituted more
than 60 percent of total trial hours.
Additionally, in introducing the bill in May 1990, Senator Biden said that it
was designed in part to provide greater court access to middle-class
Americans who are being priced out of the litigation market. 9 The Senator
fails to recognize, however, that most litigation involving middle-class
Americans occurs in state courts. In commenting on the bill, Chief Judge
Cook of the Eastern District of Michigan noted that "[flast track legal
procedures generally harm those who need to schedule their time and
attendance around substantially competing business and personal
interests. ' 10 This is a polite way of saying that the fast track procedures
envisioned by the Biden Bill will likely impact the plaintiffs' bar significantly
more than the defendants' bar, since it is the plaintiffs' bar that most middleclass Americans look to for representation.
III
Questions about the Biden Bill abound. Where did it come from? Why
was it introduced at the time it was? Who drafted it? Who briefed Senator
Biden as to its purposes so that in introducing it he deprecated the work of
magistrates? Actually, if one searches, partial answers to these questions can
be found.
The bill did not grow like Topsy. In 1988, the Foundation for Change, a
non-profit group of which Senator Biden is the honorary chairperson,
commissioned Louis Harris and Associates to poll attitudes about the courts
and causes of delay and expense. The Harris report, entitled ProceduralReform
of the Civil Justice System,I' identified discovery abuse and inadequate case
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management as the culprits causing increased transaction costs and delay in
the resolution of cases in court. The report recommended closer judicial

control over the discovery process and better judicial management of cases as
the solutions to the vices it described. The Harris report did not confine itself
to the sins of the federal courts but rather applied, as I read it, to all courts,
federal and state.
Following the Harris report, the Foundation for Change, in cooperation
with the Brookings Institution, established a task force to study ways of
reducing cost and delay in the movement of cases in federal courts. As with
the first study, I do not know the details of who financed the study and who

selected the members of the task force. It appears that the study was financed
in part by Aetna Life and Casualty Foundation, the Association of Trial
Lawyers of America, and Whittaker Corporation. The report, entitled Justice
for All: Reducing Costs and Delays in Civil Litigation, 12 made a variety of
procedural recommendations for all federal district courts. The principal
recommendation was that each district court develop and implement a "Civil
Justice Reform Plan" within twelve months. The report proposed that the
plan include several elements:
" a system of case tracking or differentiated case management that
(a) set early, firm trial dates at the outset of all non-complex cases
and (b) set time guidelines for the completion of discovery;
* a policy of permitting only narrowly drawn "good cause"
exceptions for delaying trials or discovery deadlines;
* procedures for resolving motions necessary to meet trial dates
and the discovery deadlines;
* a requirement that authorized representatives of the parties with
decisionmaking authority be present or available during any
settlement conference;
* regular publication of reports on pending undecided motions and
caseload progress;
* a provision that magistrates do not perform tasks best performed
by judges; and
* mechanisms for reducing backlogs in the district courts with
3
significant backlogs. '

The report also suffers from various weaknesses. First, it makes no
mention of the effect of the criminal caseload on the progress of civil cases in
federal courts and seriously denigrates the single most valuable tool available
for aggressive case management, the magistrate system. Additionally, no
federal judge served on the task force; two federal judges are listed as
advisers. Ironically, one of the advisers subsequently became chair of the
special Judicial Conference Committee responsible for working with the
12. Justice for All: Reducing Costs and Delays in Civil Litigation (Brookings Inst, 1989). The
Brookings Institution has disavowed responsibility for the report, notwithstanding the use of the
Institution's imprimatur to promote its validity. Id at vii.
13. Id at 12-29.
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Senate Judiciary Committee and Senator Biden in an effort to reshape the bill
in a form acceptable to federal judges. In my view, the task force relies on the
ability of federaljudges to solve the problem of how to put a square peg into a
round hole.
IV
Professor Kramer recommends establishing a new office in Congress to
assist in the congressional consideration of proposed legislation that would
affect federal courts. As he noted, and as I mentioned at the beginning of this
comment, interests with narrow, focused demands always will defeat broad
reform. The need for broad reform in case management procedures in
federal courts has not been made out. When all is said and done, it appears
that, given the financing of Justicefor All, the precursor of the Biden Bill, the
bill is being driven by special interests. And it is these same kinds of interests
that will defeat Professor Kramer's recommendation-or inhibit its utilityunless these special interest groups find some personal value in it.

